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Countries  tend  to react as though  favorable  external  shocks  are
permanent  and unfavorable  external  shocks  are  temporary.  This
tendency  - together  with  the magnitude  and diversity  in effect
of external  shocks  - complicates  attempts  to get  prices  right  and
to determine  what right prices should be. It might also help
explain why growth  rates differ  among  countries.
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Policy fornulation  in most countries is compli-  by combining a pro-export bias with tightening
cated by the role of the extemal economic  of domestic demand; its balance of payments
environment, especially during periods of great  soon began to improve. The United States, on the
external shocks. McCarthy and Dhareshwar  other hand, allowed its export share to deterio-
examine how individual countries were affected  rate and relied more on external financing -
by, and responded to, extemal shocks. They  with unfavorable consequences for its current
apply an enhanced version of an earlier method-  account.
ology for estimating the effect of three kinds of
shock: terms of trade, variations in global  Among developing countries, easy access to
demand, and changes in the interest rate. They  external financing often provided an easy short-
discuss the magnitude of these shocks and  term option for policymakers - especially in
country responses to them in Brazil, Ireland, and  countries with a strong anti-export bias where
Korea and present numerical results for some  political expediency precluded any significant
other countries.  curtailment of durmestic  spending.  A policy of
leaning on extemal financing often created
McCarthy and Dhareshwar find that the  cxternal balance problems in the medium term.
magnitude of extemal shocks may be greater
than previously recognized. For large industrial  McCarthy and Dhareshwar conclude that the
OECD countries, such as Gernany,  it is not  magnitude and composition of external shocks
unusual for external shocks to equal 2 percent of  should be part of any explanation of why growth
GDP in any one year. And such shocks range as  rates differ among countries. Some countries
high as 10 percent or more in some developing  tend to view favorable shocks as permanent and
countries, particularly those that depend heavily  unfavorable shocks as temporary. This asymme-
on a large trade share in commodities. The size  try of response, together with the magnitude of
and components of the shock depend on such  the shocks, complicates attempts to get the prices
factors as the country's openness to trade, the  right - and even to determine what the right
composition of its imports and exports, and its  price is.
level of extemal debt.
In formulating economic policy, McCarthy
The authors also found that countries dif-  and Dhareshwar argue, policymakers must
fered greatly in their responses to extemal  adequately consider extemal shocks, because of
shocks. Some rely on additional extemal financ-  their major impact on economies. They do not
ing, some place more emphasis on export  answer the question: Which policy instruments
promotion, and others favor import substitution.  are the correct response in which situations? But
Among industrial OECD countries, for example,  they do offer insights that may be of use to
Germany addressed unfavorable extemal shocks  policymakers facing these issues.
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1.  Policy  formulation  in  most  countries  is  complicated  by the  role  of
the  external  economic  environment  especially  during  periods  when large  shocks
are taking  place.  In this  paper  a  particular  aspect  of this  problem  is
considered,  namely  the  impact  of external  shocks  on the  current  account  of
individual  countriea  and  how these  countries  responded  to them. A methodology
is devised  that  a'-lows  one to estimate  these  shocks  and  the  response,  on a
yearly  basis. The results  are  discussed  in some  detail  for  three  countries,
Brazil,  Ireland  and  Korea.  Preliminary  results  are  provided  for  a  number  of
other  countries. Three  broad  classes  of shocks  are  considered,  torms  of
trade,  variations  in global  demand  and interest  rate  changes. The  results
obtained  suggest  that the  size  of external  shocks  may  be larger  than
previously  recognized. For the  large  OECD industrialized  countries,  such  as
Cermany,  it is  not unusual  to have external  shocks  equal  to 2 percent  of GDP
in any  one  year  'hile  for  some  of the  developing  countries  they  can  range  as
high as 10 percent  or  more.  This is  especially  true  in those  countries  with
large  trade  share  and  heavy  dependenc;  on commodities. The responses  also
show great  differences.  Among  OECD inc -rrialized  countries  Germany,  for
example,  addressed  unfavorable  external  shocks  by combining  a proexport  bias
with tightening  of domestic  demand  so that  the  baance  of payments  soon  began
to improve. The  United  States  on the  other  hand  allowed  its  export  share  to
deterlorate  and tended  to rely  more  on external  financing  with rather  unfavor-
able  consequences  for  its  current  account. Among  developing  countries,  easy
access  to  external  financing  provided  an easy  option  in the  short  term  for
policymakers  in  many instances. This  was  particularly  true  where  strong  anti-
export  bias already  existed  and  political  expediency  precluded  any significant- 2 -
curtailment  of domestic  expenditure.  Such  policy  choices  often  led  to major
problems  with external  balances  in the  medium  term.
2.  In the  cu-rrent  debate  on  why growth  rates  differ  between  countries
the  results  obtained  in this  work suggest  that  the  magnitude  of external
shocks  strongly  suggest  that  they  need to  be included  as part of the
explanatory  process.  In responding  to shocks  the  tendency  seems  to  be to view
favorable  shocks  as permanent  and  vice-versa. This asymmetry  of response
together  with the  magnitude  of the  shocks  complicates  further  any  attempts  to
get  the  prices  right  or indeed  to determine  what the  right  prices  should  be.
II.  THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS
3.  There  is extensive  literature  on the  role  of external  factors  in
economic  development. These  range  from the  work  on terms  of trade  by Ricardo
to  more recent  work  by Lewis  (1969),  Prebisch  (1950)  and Singer  (1950).
Broadly  speaking  these  authors  argued  that  over  the long  run  the  tendency  is
for  the terms  of trade  of commodity  exporting  countries  to  deteriorate.
Economists  in countries  such  as Australia  with  a large  traded  sector  have also
devoted  considerable  attention  to these  issues. Salter  (1959)  and  Swan (1960)
have  made  basic analytical  contributions  for  the  analysis  of  booms  and  busts.
More recently,  one finds  the  problem  rediscovered  as the  Dutch  disease  which
afflicted  some  oil  exporting  countries  in  particular. Corden  (1984)  provides
a  useful  review.- 3 -
4.  In recent  years  there  has  been renewed  debate  on the  differences
in growth  performance  between  countries. The  traditional  view of long-term
growth  based  on Solows  model (1970)  is  becoming  increasingly  questioned.
Romer (1.989)  has  proposed  including  the  role  of economies  of scale  while  other
analysis  tends  to focus  on the  role  of the  external  environment  and the
relative  importance  of domestic  policies. The  external  environment  can  affect
countries  in  widely  differing  ways  while  at the  same time  countries  can  choose
to respond  to it  by a  variety  of approaches.  11.cent  events  in the  Middle
East  have  once  more emphasized  the  need for  assessing  the  role  of the
international  environment  and ideally  how countries  might  best respond  to it.
The price  of oil doubled  to  about  US$30  a barrel,  most  major stock  markets
lost  about  10-15  percent  of their  value,  and, at least  for  a while,  there  has
been a general  upward  thrust  in  world  interest  rates. These  events  have
produced  added  impetus  for  the  study  of  what are  broadly  termed  shocks. The
present  work provides  one  approach  for  weakening  external  shocks.
5.  There  is little  unanimity  in the  literature  on  what actually
constitutes  a shock  or  how it should  be measured. In this  paper  the  geaeral
approach  is that,  any deviation  from  the  pattern  of the immediately  preceding
years,  is considered  a shock. One can  readily  modify  these  criteria  by the
design  of appropriate  digital  filters. Depending  on one's  interests,  for
instance,  one could  filter  out  various  harmonics  corresponding  to either
business  cycles  or  Kondratieff  style  waves.  The  particular  advantage  of the
present  approach  is that it  allows  one  to compute  the impact  of shocks  on a
year-by-year  basis.  This is elaborated  on further  in the  section  on
methodology.6.  A number  of authors  have  focused  on different  aspects  of shocks
and  adjustment. These  include  Bruno's  (1982)  emphasis  on structural  change,
Khan (1986)  highlightLng  the  exchange  rate  or  van  Wijnbergen  (1984)  on short-
term  adjustment  measures  for  oil  price  shocks. The principal  focus  in the
present  work is  on the  current  account:  the  impact  of the  external
environment  on the  current  account--and  the  adjustment  in response  to it.
This is  estimated  for  a  variety  of countries. The  analysis  is  generally  for
the  period  1973-1989  except  for  some  relatively  minor  data  limitations.
7.  Over  the  last  two  decades  there  have  been a  number  of major
shocks. These  have resulted  in  wide  repercussions  for  the  global  economy.
Depending  on the  spec'i,c  country  these  can  be either  favorable  or
unfavorable. The  more  notable  shocks  were:
(a)  The  Qil shocks  of 1973  and  1979.
(b)  Significant  changes  in terms  of trade. These  include  the  supply
shortfall  in a  number  of agricultural  commodities  in the  early
seventies,  the  coffee/tea  boom of the later  seventies  and  the
generally  unfavorable  trends  in  many commodity  prices  in recent
years.
(c)  The rapid  increase  in  world interest  rates  in the  late
seventies/early  eighties.-5-
(d)  Changes  in  the  global  demand  for  easprts,  strongly  positive  for
most  of  the  period  1965-89  but interrupted  by slowc3wn  in some
years  and  more notably  by a serious  recession  in the  early
eighties.
(e)  Changes  in  official  and  especially  private  transfers  to some
countries  and the  sharp  drop in  private  loan  capital  following  the
debt  crisis  of the  1980s.
(f)  There  have also  been significant  changes  in the  composition  of
exports,  as the  relative  importance  of commodities  declined,  while
that  of high tech  items  increased. (This  change  in  composition  is
not covered  in the  present  analysis).
8.  These  shocks  lead  to a number  of interesting  questions. How  big
was their  impact? How  vulnerable  were different  countries? What  were the
welfare  effects  on different  countries/groups  of countries. Who gained/lost?
What  was the  policy  response? In  particular  are  there  any  lessons  for  future
policy  formation? For  developing  countries  in  particular,  how important  are
these  external  shocks  compared  to the  role  of domestic  policies? The  present
paper is  a  first  step  in analyzing  these  issues. It is  shown  that  both the
impact  of shocks  and the  policy  response  to them  tend  to vary  widely  between
countries. It is to  be noted  that  some  shocks  are  not  independent  of each
other;  thus,  terms  of trade  changes  could  also  be associated  with changes  in
interest  rates  or the  growth  of the  global  economy. This  further  complicates
the  task  of the  policymaker  in the  choice  of appropriate  response. It is-6-
perhaps  not surprising  that  shocks  have such  different  impact,  when one
considers  the  differences  in economies,  in terms  of openness,  domestic  markat
size,  import  composition,  level  and  structure  of external  debt.  However,  the
variety  in  policy  responses,  as  measured  by performance  indicators,  evon  at
the  aggregate  level  considered  here,  is  more intriguing. While  some of these
differences  may  be due  to variations  in structure  between  countries,  there
still  remain  striking  differences  in  policy  response,  especially  in areas  such
as the  reliance  on foreign  borrowing,  or the  amount  of emphasis  on domestic
contraction  or export  promotion.
III. GLOBAL  SHOCKS
9.  Three  principal  types  of external  shocks  are considered  over the
period  1973-1989: terms  of trade, changes  in global  demand  for  exports,  and
interest  rate  changes. This analysis  can  be readily  extended  tc consider  a
more detailed  study  of shocks. In  particular  it seems  important  to consider
separately  non-fuel  and  manufactures  terms  of trade  movements. For  some
countries  changes  in the  level  of transfers  and  other  capital  flows  are  an
important  component  of the  current  account  adjustment,  while  for  other
countries  the  economic  situation  in their  respective  trading  partners  may  be
of particular  relevance.
o  Terms  of Trade.  Since  1965,  the  aggregate  pattern  for  prices  of
commodities  other  than  oil  has  been  a strong  downward  trend
interrupted  only  by a few  boom  years (Figure  1).  Thus  between
1973  and  1989  commodity  exporters  lost  about  US$130  billion  (in-7-
Figure 1: NON-r'IL  COMMODITY  PRICE
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1980  prices)  or around  25  percent  of their  export  earnings  through
price  effects  alone. If one  adjusars  for  changes  in  volume  the
estimated  dollar  loss  would  be even  bigger. The size  of these
losses  varies  greatly  between  countzies. Some  indication  of
changes  in  terms  of trade  for  various  subaggregates  are  given  in
Figure  2.  Big losers  in recent  years  are those  countries  with
export  composition  tilted  towards  agricultural  comodities.  These
include  many of the  poorer  countries  in  AMrica,  where  coffee  and
cocoa  figure  prominently  in  their  exports.
o  Global  Demand  Effects. The level  of  world  trade  is,  to a large
extent,  determined  by global  economic  activity  which  in turn  is
mainly  determined  by OECD  activity. World  trade  has exhibited  a
steady  growth  since  the  sixties  with  notable  exceptions  in the
mid-seventies  and  early  eighties  (Figure  3).  However,  the  rnate  of
increase  has slowed  from  around  8 percent  p.a. in the  sixties  to
about  half that  in the  late  eighties. Again  the  effect  of these
changes  vari.es  greatly  between  countries. On average,  the
elasticity  of developing  country  growth  with rospect  to the  growth
of  world  trade  is  around  0.5  percent  but this  varies  a great  deal
depending  on country  trade  partners.
O  Interest  Rate Effects. The  nominal  interest  rate (on  six-month
US$ LIBOR)  has  varied  between  5 and  16  percent  since  1965 (Figure
4). The impact  of these  changes  on  current  accounts  also  varies  a
great  deal  between  countries,  depending,  in the  first  place,  on-9-
Figure  2: REAL  COMMOD1TY  PRICES
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whether  they  are  net debtor  or creditor,  and  then  if they  are  net
debtor,  like  most of the  developing  countries,  the  level  and
composition  of debt. However,  the  main impact  of the  rise in
interest  rates  (for  many of the  developing  countries)  has  been
increasing  indebtedness.
O  Transfers. Transfers  have  provided  a significant  component  of
balance  of payments  support  for  many  poorer  countries  for  a number
of years.  More recently  some  members  of the  European  Community
have benefitted  irom  significant  transfers.
IV.  PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS  OF POLICY  RESPONSE
10.  The performance  response  is  considered  by estimating  four
indicators:  export  promotion,  import  substitution,  macroeconomic  contraction
(expansion),  and  external  financing.  Again these  estimates  can  be extended  to
include,  for  instance,  various  sub-aggregates  for export  promotion  or import
substitution.
o  Exoort  Promotion: the  change  in  export  market  share  compared  to
recent  levels. This  provides  a  measure  of the  success  of overall
policy  in stimulating  exports.- 11  -
Figure  3: WORLD  TRADE  LEVELS  AND GROWTH  RATES
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°  ImPQrt  Substitution: change  in imports  as measured  by
change  in import/GDP  ratio. This gives  an indication
of relative  importance  of substitution  attempts  within
the  economy,  and  the  degree  to  which the  policy
response  favored  increased  trade  liberalization.  It
would  be preferable  to  use change  in import  elasticity
rather  than in import  share  but there  are important
difficulties  in interpreting  point  estimates.
o  Macroeconomic  Contraction  (Expansion):  the impact  of changes  in
the  level  of macroeconomic  activity,  as  measured  by GNP growth
rate,  on the level  of import  demand.
o  External  Financing: the  amount  of additional  external  financing
beyond  that  required  in  the  previous  year for "unshocked  "level  of
exports  and  :mports. The  present  work does  not  discuss  risk
hedging  policies--financing,  diversification,  hedging  strategies
or  what part these  play in  mitigating  the  original  shocks. Given
the  major  role  of external  financing  in the  policy  response  it
would  be interesting  to analyze  this  component  further.
11.  Policy  Variables/Indicators.  The  pattern  of  policy  variables
provide  some  guidance  on the  measures  behind  the  policy  response  adopted  by
individual  countries. These  variables  include  exchange  rate,  government
deficit,  domestic  credit,  domestic  energy  price,  and  a metric  of trade- 14 -
posture. More extensive  analysis  of  public  finances  can  provide  insight  on
how the  adjustment  policies  relied  on,  changes  in expenditures  for
investment/social  sectors  while,  revenue  changes  can  indicate  alterations  in
the  tax  regime. There  variables  can then  be combined  with  various  measures  of
adjustment  such  as GNP growth  rate,  domestic  savings  rate,  productivity,  and
OD
inflation  rate.  For  many of the  more developed  countries  unemployment
statistics  provide  a good indicator  of the  impact  of adjustment,  while the
impact  of adjustment  for  some  of the  poorer  countries  can  be captured  by
various  social  indicators  such  as infant  mortality,  nutritional  status,  or
educational  level.  However,  many  of these  operate  with long  lags  and  many
countries'  data are  poor.
IV.  ANALYTICALEFAMEWORK
12.  General  statements  at an aggregate  or regional  country  group  level
about  external  shocks  and  the  response  to  them  are  only  of limited  value  to
policymakers. Since  most  policy  is  made at the  country  level  it is  essential
that  such  work  be complemented  by analysis  at the  individual  country  level.
The  methodology  used in this  study  is  a  modified  version  of that  developed  by
Balassa  (1981).
13.  The  postwar  years  through  1973  may  be considered  a tranquil  period
for  the  world  economy,  especially  as compared  to the  period  since  then,  which
has  been characterized  by a number  of shocks  of different  nature. While it
might  be obvious,  over  a  speeified  period,  that  a given  country  has  been
buffeted  by adverse  developments,  the  composition  and  extent  of the  shocks- 15  -
impinging  on the  economy  are  not  observable. Nor  are the  adjustments
undertaken  by the  economy  in  response  to the  shocks. An accounting  or
modelling  framework  is needed  to quantify  the  shocks  and  adjustments.
14.  There is  a variety  of such  frameworks  in literature,  ranging  from
heuristic  accounting  formulations  through  macroeconometric  simulation  models
and  computable  general  equilibrium  models,  and  on through  theoretical  multi-
period  models  with sound  microeconomic  foundations. The simpler  heuristic
technique  followed  in.  this  paper  has  the  virtues  of transparency  of
interpretation  and  ease of empirical  implementation  for  a large  number  of
countries. This  technique  has also  been  used in  Balassa-McCarthy  (1984)  and
McAleese-McCarthy  (1989). The following  is a  brief  summary  of the technique.
15.  If one  assumes  that  for  a given  country,  under  conditions  of
"business  as usual,"  there  is a stabla  pattern  of evolution  of such  variables
as world  trade,  import  prices,  export  prices,  and  interest  rates,  then  these,
together  with a known,  stable  set  of  policies,  determine  the  current  account
balance  for  the  country. For  convenience,  the  set  of values  for  these
variables  (and  for  the  current  account  balance)  expected  normally  to  prevail
for  a given  year or  period  may  be referred  to as the "trend"  set of  values.
Now suppose  this  economy  is  hit  by a  major  shock  or shocks,  such  as an adverse
terms-of-trade  movement,  a contraction  of  demand  for  its  exports,  or an
interest  rate  increase. The  country  will  respond  to the  shocks  Wit;b  a range
of policy  adjustments,  including  trade  adjustments. As a  combined  result  of
the  shocks  and  the  adjustments,  the  "actual"  or observed  values  assumed  by
these  variables  and the  current  account  balance  for  the  period  will be- 16 -
different  from the  "trend"  configuration  that  would  have resulted  in the
absence  of  shocks  and  adjustments. In other  words,  the  difference  between  the
'trend"  values  and the  "actual"  values  is due  to shocks  ad  adjustments.
16.  The  respective  effects  of shocks  and  adjustments  may  be decomposed
by introducing  the  concept  of a "hypothetical"  configuration  of the  relevant
variables  corresponding  to the  state  of  the  economy,  as it  would  be, given  the
shocks,  but  without  adjustment. Then  the  difference  between  the  'hypothetical
current  account  deficit"  and  the "trend  current  account  deficit"  may  be taken
to  be the  overall  effect  of the  shocks  on the  economy,  and the  difference
between  the "hypothetical  current  account  deficit"  and  the "actual  current
account  deficit"  to  be the  overall  effect  of the  adjustment  (Figure  5).  A
similar  analysis  of the  components  of the  current  account  deficit  yields
further  insight  into  the  adjustment  process.
17.  Thus the  essential  core  of the  methodology  is  based  on devising
three measures  of the  current  account  for  each  year of the  period  under
analysis.  These  are  called:
Actual: A ;  Trend: T ;  Hypothetical:  H.
A:  the  current  year  U.S. dollar  level  of current  account
as reported  in the  IFS.
T:  The  value  that  would  result  if  variables  continued  to
evolve  in  a no shock  situation. For  convenience  this-17  -
Figure  5: THE  "SHOCKS  AND  ADJUSTMENTS"  SCHEMA
Current  Account  Deficit
Hypothetical  value
(shocks  and  no  adjustment)
Actualvauef
(shocks  and  adjustment)
A  ctual  value...................................................  ...............................................
Trend  value
(no  shocks)- 18 -
is called  the  trend  value.  In order  to  compute  this
one  has to  make certain  assumptions. In the  present
work it is assumed  that  in a no shock  situation,  macro
aggregates  such  as  GDP growth,  continue  at a rate
equal  to that  achieved  during  the  previous  three
years,  while  share  values,  such  as export  share  of
total  world  exports,  remains  equal  to the  average
value  over the  previous  three  years.
H:  This  is  hypothetical. It is the  value  that  would
result  in the  face  of changing  external  conditions  if
domestic  policy  had remained  unchanged. Again  trying
to specify  this  poses  many difficulties.  It can  be
defined  in  many  ways.  In this  paper  the following
procedure  is  adopted. The  hypothetical  level  of trade
is  defined  as the level  of trade  that  would  result  if
a country  maintained  its  share  (average  over  the last
three  years)  of the  actual  (current)  value  of total
world  trade--the  assumption  being that  unchanged
domestic  policy  would  just  maintain  trade  share.
Shock  S:  is  then  defined  as H-T.  (Note  that  the  convention
adopted  is  that  unfavorable  shocks  are  positive).
Response  R:  is defined  as  H-A- 19 -
Additional  Financing  F:  is  defined  as A-T
Thus it is  noted  that  the shock,  S, minus  the  response  to it,  R, equals  the
additional  financing,  F.  There  may  also  be changes  in  unrelated  factors  that
affect  the  level  of financing. These  are  not  considered  here  but can  be
incorporated  in a  more dotailed  analysis. Put  another  way if the  response
exactly  offsets  the  shock  then  no additional  financing  is indicated,  while  a
weak or inadequate  response  would  require  some  positive  level  of additional
financing.
18.  Analytical  details  are  as follows. For  a given  year,  let
C  - the  current  account  deficit  in  current  U.S.  dollars
!  - the  volume  of merchandise  imports
X  - the  volume  of merchandise  exports
PM - import  price  index  in  U.S.  dollars
Px  - export price index in U.S. dollars
F  - the  interest-sensitive  part  of net  factor-service  payments  in
U.S. dollars
N  - the  non-interest  sensitive  part of  net factor-service  payments
plus  net  non-factor  service  payments
U  - private  and  of.icial  unrequited  transfers,  in  U.S.  dollars
19.  Let  subscripts  T and  H refer  to the  "trend"  and "hypothetical"
values  of the  variables,  and the  unsubscripted  form  of the  variables,  to the
actual  values. Then,  the  current  account  deficit  may  be defined  as imports- 2o  -
minus  exports  plus factor  payments  by the  country  minus  transfers  to the
country. That is,
C - HMP  - XPX + F  + N  - U  (1)
Similarly,  the "trend"  and "hypothetical"  values:
CT-  - -p  - TPTx  +FT  +  NT - UT  (2)
Cg-  _H  - XPx  + Fs + NH - UH  (3)
Then
total  shock  - CT - C 
and  '
adjustment  - CH  - C.
20.  C-CT  is  the  difference  between  shocks  and  adjustments;  it
quantifies  the  additional  external  financing  necessitated  by the  shocks.
Following  Balassa-McCarthy  (1984),  it  may  be defined  as a component  of
adjustment,  thus  arriving  at a  shocks-adjustment  identity.- 21  -
21.  The 'trend"  scenario  (no  shocks)  may be arrived  at on the
following  plausible  assumptions:
Ti.  The import  and  export  prices  equal  the  average  of past three
years.
T2.  The  world  trade  would  grow at the  medium-term  rate it  had for  the
past  three  years.
T3.  The  country  maintains  its  share  of  world  exports,  computed  as its
average  share  over  the  past three  years.
T4.  The  GDP  of the  country  would  grow  in the  current  year  at the
medium-term  rate it  had  at each  of the  past three  years.
TS.  The country's  ratio  of imports  to  GDP  remains  the  same  as the
average  of  v  e past  three  years.
T6.  The trend  interest  rate is  assumed  to remain  the  same  as in the
past three  years.
T7.  The  net  unrequited  private  and  government  transfers  to the  country
maintain  their  level  at the  average  of the  past three  years.
T8.  Net non-factor  service  payments  and  non-interest  sensitive
component  of factor-service  payments  are  the same  as the  observed
values.
22.  The formal  expressions  are  as follows:- 22 -
Trade  prices:
Px(t)  - (PX(t  - 3)PX(t-2)PX(t-1))13
and  similarly  for  PTM.
Income: Let
Y(t)  - GDP of the  country  in  year t in  real  terms,  in 1980  U.S.
dollars,  and
g(t)  - GDP  growth  rate  from  1965  through  year t,  as estimated  by
OLS.  Then
YT(t)  - [Y(t-3)(g(t-3)) 3y(t-2)(g(t-2)) 2Y(y-1)g(t-l) 113
Expected  ("trend")  world  trade  is computed  analogously.
Interest  rate:
I(TM - ((I  +  i(t  - 3))(1  +  i(t  - 2))(1  +  l(t  - 1)))1/3- 23 -
Then,  the "trend"  factor-service  payments  (the  interest-sensitive  part)
would  be
FT  - 'TF
23.  Depending  on the  level  of detail  needed  and  data  availability,  it
is possible  to make the  "trend"  scenario  more  realistic  and  sophisticated.
For  example,  an alternative  to T2  would  be to focus  on the income  and import
demand  growth  in three  major  partner  countries  (rather  than the  growth  of
world  trade)  as in  Mitra. As another  example,  net  private  transfers  could  be
related  to wage  rates  in related  countries,  and  net official  transfers  to
growth  rates  of industrial  countries.
24.  The "hypothetical"  scenario  (shocks  and  no adjustment)  may  be
constructed  on the  following  assumptions:
HI.  The  observed  import  and  export  prices  for  the  year.
H2.  The  actual  world  trade  for  the  year.
H3.  The  country  passively  accepts  its  share  of  world  exports  utithout
any  additional  export  promotion  effort.
H4.  The  real  GDP  of the  country  would  grow in the  current  year at the
same  rate  as the  trend  rate,  adjusted  for  the  difference  in
"trend"  exports  and "hypothetical"  exports.
H5.  The country's  ratio  of imports  to GDP  remains  the  same as  over the
past three  years.- 24  -
H6.  The  actual  interest  rates  for  the  period.
H7.  The  actual  transfers  for  the  period.
25.  The  assumption  Hl implies  that  the  country  is  a price-taker  in the
imports  market,  and that  changes  in  export  promotion  effort  by the  country,  if
any, is reflected  in its  observed  share  of  world  trade  being  different  from
"trend." The latter  could  be relaxe4  in  a more  comprehensive  framework  that
would  incorporate  effects  such  as those  due to  changes  in the  real  exchange
rate  or labor  market  adjustments. From  HI we have
Pa  - pM  and  PH - PX.  (4)
From  H2 and  H3,  we can  readily  compute  Xi.  Then,  using  H4,  we can arrive  at
the  'hypothetical"  GDP  as the "trend"  GDP adjusted  for  Xi - XT.  This  would
yield  MH through  assumption  H5.  That  is,  if  m is the  country's  imports-to-
output  ratio,  its "hypothetical"  GDP  would  then  be given  by
YH(t)  - YT(t)  +  H - XT
and the  "hypothetical"  imports  by
MH  - mY 5(t).- 25  -
From  H6,  we get
F3 - F.  (5)
Assumption  H7 is that  unrequited  transfers  are  invariant  to policy
adjustments,  that  is,
uH -U.  (6)
Using  (4)  through  (6),  we may  write (3)  as
C,  - PM%  - PXXH + F  + N  - U.  (3')
Thus,  we  have
shock-  C  - CT
[(PM  PNM)MT  (PX,  PTX)X]1  +  [PM(N  - MT)  .. PX(X  XT)I
+ F(l - T)  - (U - UT),  (7)26 -
and
adjustment  - CH  - C
- p4(IN  _  M) - PX(X5 - X).  (8)
26.  The  various  groups  of terms  in the  expression  for  shocks  in
equation  (7)  may  be interpreted  as follows.
27.  The first  group, ((PM  - PT')MI  - (PX  - PTX)  ]XT,  shows  the  price
effect  of the  disturbances  on "trend"  import  and  export  volumes,  and thus  may
be taken  as the  price  or terms-of-trade  shock.
28.  The  second  group, [Pm (M& - XT)  - Px(Xs  - X$)],  measures  the  net  quantity
effect  of the  disturbances.  The export-volume  shock  is  -Pz(XH_XT)
and the  offset  due  to the  resultant  reduction  in imports  is  given  by
pM P  _  r)  .
29.  The term  F(l  - IT/I)  is  the  interest-rate  shock.- 27 -
30.  The  various  terms  in the  expression  for  adjustment  in  equation  (8)
may  be interpreted  as follows. The term  Pm(M.  - M)  represents  the  reduction
in the import  bill  from the  hypothetical  scenario,  and  may  be further  broken
down into  two  components:  import  reduction  through  a growth  slowdown  and
import  substitution  (reduction  in  the imports-to-output  ratio). Formally,  let
M' be the imports  of goods  if the  imports-to-output  ratio  stayed  the same.
Then M' - mY,  and  we have
pMQ  - M) - PM(Ma  - M!)  + PM(Mf - M).
The term  PM(M  - MI)  denotes the reduction in imports achieved by allowing
the  output  to fall,  and  the  term  PM(M/ - M)  denotes  import  substitution.  It
may  be noted  that there  is  a degree  of arbitrariness  in this  decomposition.
31.  Finally,  the  term  PX(X,  - X)  stands  for  export  promotion  efforts
by the  country.
32.  Data  Sources. The  balance-of-payments  data are  all  from  IFS,
downloaaed  through  BESD.1/ These  include:  current  account  balance,  exports
1/  Bank Economic  and  Social  Database,  User's  Guide,  World  Bank,  July 1989.- 28 -
and imports,  transfers,  and factor-service  payments. The income  data  are  also
from  BESD.  Trade  price  indices  are from  World  Bank sources.2/ The
relatively  recent  innovation  by the  Fund  of separating  factor  and nonfactor
service  flows  has  been  helpful. It  has  been assumed  that  half of net factor
service  payments  are interest  sensitive. The interest  rate  variable,  i, is
the  six  month  U.S. dollar  LIBOR.
33.  The  main  bottleneck--limiting  the  coverage  across  countries  and
time  as  well as depth  of analysis--has  been trade  prices. In the  analysis,
the  unit  values  of imports  and  exports,  from  IFS,  have  been  used.  For a
majority  of developing  countries,  unit  values  are  not available. Further,  it
would  be straightforward  to  extend  the  above  analysis  to study  the  effects  of
nonfuel  terms  of trade,  manufactures  terms  of trade,  adjustment  to fuel
shocks,  and  promotion  of manufactures  exports  as further  trade  price  data
becomes  available.
V.  SHOCKS  IN  BRAZIL.  IRELAND  AND  KOREA
34.  Preliminary  estimates  have  been  made  of the  shocks  and  policy
response  to them  for  about  50 countries. In this  section,  three  countries  are
selected  which  reflect  some  degree  of variation  in,  not  only the  magnitude  of
the  shocks  and the  response  to them,  but also  the  prevailing  country
conditions. These  are  Brazil,  Ireland  and  Korea. Further  details  on shocks
and responses  to them  for  the  second  oil  shock  are given  in Balassa  and
2/  Further  details  are  given  in  M. Riordan,  DEC  Analytical  Data Base,  IBRD,
forthcoming.- 29  -
McCarthy  (1984)  for  Brazil  and  Korea  while  the  Irish  situation  is  discussed  in
McAleese  and  McCarthy  (1989). Brazil  was a relatively  successful  country  up
to the  first  oil  shock  and  continued  to  maintain  a strong  growth  performance
into  the  mid-seventies. However,  -ne  severity  of external  shocks  and
inappropriate  policy  choices  eventually  led  to an unfortunate  situation:
much of the  Irish  economy  was inward-looking  up to the  early  eighties. A
poorly  conceived  attempt  to stabilize  the  economy  in the  early  eighties  was
unsuccessful  and led  to results  such  as the  debt/GDP  ratio  rising  to  over 100
percent. However,  adjustment  efforts  were  more  successful  in the  late
eighties. The  policy  package  at this  time  included  a mixture  of export
oriented  policies,  incomes  policy  and  strong  support  from  the  EEC.  Korea  was
a  relatively  open  economy  and  so suffered  rather  large  shocks. However,  the
strong  productive  capacity  of the  economy  and  a highly  elastic  supply  response
meant  that  external  adjustment  could  be achieved  through  a combination  of
changes  to  relative  prices  and  adjustment  to domestic  demand. Eventually
favorable  improvement  in terms  of trade  and  a  more  buoyant  global  economy
provided  further  stimulus  to a strong  economic  performance.
35.  The shocks  and  the  policy  response  for  these  three  countries  are
now considered  in  more detail. This  format  is similar  to that  used in
Balassa-McCarthy  (1984)  but  with two  principal  differences. The  present  work
is for  a longer  period  while the  shocks  together  with the  response  to them is
given  on a year-by-year  basis. The  country  coverage  in this  work is also  much
broader  and, in  particular,  includes  a  number  of industrialized  countries.- 30 -
(a)  Brazil.  (The  broad  picture  is given  in Figure  6.  Details  are
given  in  Appendix  1).
(i)  External  Shocks. The  most  significant  external  shocks  were:
unfavorable  shocks  in  1975,  3.1  percent  of CDP; 1980,  3.7
percent  of  GDP; and  1981,  4.2  percent  of GDP;  and  a
favorable  shock  in 1986,  2.4  percent  of GDP. Most of the
1975 shock  was  due to  a terms-of-trade  loss  compounded  by a
slowdown  in  global  demand. The 1980/81  shocks  were
primarily  due  to unfavorable  movement  in terms-of-trade  and
to a lesser  extent,  slowdown  in global  demand  together  with
higher  interest  rates. The favorable  shock  in 1986  was  due
to improvement  in terms-of-trade  and  a reduction  in interest
rates.
(ii) Policies  Applied
a.  The  response  to the  first  oil  shock  was expansionary.
This  was accommodated  by heavy  reliance  on external
borrowing. The  initial  response  to the  second  oil
shock  was also  expansionary.  However,  by 1981 there
was a  policy  switch  to  contractionary  mode  with ouitput
compression  and  significant  limitations  on imports.X  X  \_ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  a - p 
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This contraction  resulted  in  a sharp  decline  in
investment  (see  Figure  6) and  in per  capita  incomes.
b.  After  the  second  oil  shock  the  policy  regime  continued
to favor  export  promotion. The  real effective
exchange  rate  depreciated  most  years  and exports
responded  by gaining  market  share.  (Detailed  results
are  given  in  Appendix  1,  page 2).  Import  limitations
resulted  in substantial  import  substitution  equivalent
to 1.4  percent,  1.4  percent,  and 2.1  percent  of GDP in
the  years  1981,  1982,  1983.
C.  The expansionary  response  to the  first  oil  shock  and
initially  to the  second  shock  resulted  in a major
external  debt  burden. When the  policy  finally  became
contractionary  a significant  part of the  adjustment
fell  on investment  and  per capita  consumption. It  was
not  possible  to  adequately  offset  the impact  of these
shocks,  even  by a strong  export  performance,  as the
total  export  sector  accounted  for  only  about  10
percent  of GDP. The tilt  against  productive  capacity
also  weakened  the  economy. When the  upturn  in the
global  economy  occurred  in the  mid-eighties,  Brazil
was not  able  to take  sufficient  advantage  of the
opportunity.  The situation  was further  compounded  by- 33 -
the  many  years  of decline  in  per capita  incomes  so
that  by the  late  eighties,  political  support  was  weak
for  any  viable  alternative  that  required  further
sacrifice.
(b)  Ireland. (Figure  7  and details  in  Appendix  1,  page 6).
(i)  External  Shocks. Ireland  was  heavily  dependent  on oil
imports  in the  seventies  and  early  eighties. Consequently,
it suffered  major  adverse  shocks  in 1974,  1975  and  again  in
1980,  1981  equivalent  to about  7  percent,  10 percent,  7
percent  and 10  percent  of GDP in  each of those  years.  These
shocks  were mostly  (about  60  percent)  due to adverse
movement  in terms  of trade  but  had  a significant  component
(about  25  percent)  due  to slowdown  in  the  global  economy.
(ii)  Policy  Resnonse
a.  The response  to the  first  shock  was some  additional
external  borrowing  but primarily  countercyclical
fiscal  policy  so that  a mild recession  ensued.
However,  even  as changes  in terms-of-trade  continued
to  be unfavorable  throughout  much  of the  seventies  the
authorities  sought  to  bolster  employment  by relying  on
external  resources.-34-
Figure  7: IRELAND
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b.  This led  to an  economy  being  particularly  vulnerable
when the  second  oil shock  struck. The situation  was
further  compounded  by the interest  rate shock  which
led  to a  burgeoning  external  debt  situation. The
deteriorating  overall  situation  masked  some  rather  new
initiatives  for  export  promotion.
C.  When the  global  economy  eventually  began  to recover  in
the  mid-eightiea  these  export  promotion  efforts  began
to yield  positive  results. At the  same time  some  of
the  external  debt  uurden  was alleviated  by transfers
resulting  from  EEC  membership. At this  juncture  it is
not  clear  whether  this  strategy  can  be sustained  if
the  global  economy  stalls  once  more.
(c)  Korea.  (Figure  8,  Details  in  Appendix  1,  page 8).
(i)  External  Shocks. Korea  was severely  impacted  by
adverse  external  shocks  in 1974,  1975  and  again  in
1980,  1981  equivalent  to 10.4  percent,  10.9  percent,
8.0  percent  and 8.2  percent,  respectively,  of GDP.
These  were primarily  due  to adverse  movements  in ttrms
of trade  effects  and  to a lesser  degree  to  a slowdown
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onwards  external  shocks  were favorable  primarily  due
to improving  terms  of trade.
(ii) Policy  Response
a.  The  response  to the  first  oil shock  was  a strong
pro-export  policy  combined  with some  constraint
on the  domestic  economy. The  economy  then
recovered  to  enjoy  a strong  period  of growth
over 10  percent. When the  second  oil  shock
struck,  this  gro6th  surge  was  eased  back some,
while  strong  encouragement  for  exports
continued.
b.  The  policy  thrust  was tcwards  a steady
depreciation  of the  exchange  rate together  withI
other  incentives  for  exporters. These  included
access  to favorable  interest  rate loans. The
strong pro-export  bias  especially  in
manufacturing  provided  a strong  basis  for
rebound  when the  global  economy  and especially
the  terms  uf  trade  for  manufactures  turned
favorable  in  the  mid-  eighties.
c.  Korea  also  increased  its  external  debt  but not
unduly  so during  the  unfavorable  shock  years.- 38 -
However  as interest  rates  eased  by the  mid-
eighties  the  authorities  were able  to move
rapidly  to improve  their  external  debt
situation.
36.  Policy  Variables. The linkage  between  the  performance  variables
and  the  actual  policy  package  that  produced  them  inevitably  varies  between
countries. This  will  be the  subject  of further  analysis  where  preliminary
analysis  suggests  the  role  of real  3ffective  exchange  rate  and  domestic  energy
pricing  policies  are  particularly  important.
VI.  SHOCKS  IN OTHER  COUMNIES
37.  In this  section  some  preliminary  results  are  noted  for  a selection
of countries  in addition  to the  three  discussed  in the  previous  section:
Brazil,  Ireland  and  Korea.  The  data  for  all  countries  are listed
alphabetically  in  Appendix  1.  The countries  chosen  c.over  a wide  variety  of
experiences  from  the  poor  developing  countries  of  Africa  to  some  of the  more
affluent  OECD  members.  It is  hoped that  this  will  provide  insight: first,  or
how countries  responded;  and  second,  which  policies  were  most effective.
0  Cote  d'Ivoire. Cote  d'Ivoire  was impacted  by a  particularly
volatile  series  of shocks  since  1973.  These  include  very
unfavorable  shocks  in 1975 (9.8  percent  GDP),  1981 (14  percent),
1982 (10  percent),  and  strong  favorable  shocks  in 1977 (13
percent),  1985 (11  percent). A notable  feature  of the  passive- 39 -
response  was the  strong  contraction  of the  economy  especially
since  1979  together  with  heavy  reliance  on import  substitution.
Germany. For  most of the  decade  preceding  1986,  Germany
experienced  adverse  but relatively  mild  shocks  due to  unfavorable
movements  in its  terms  of trade  and  weak export  markets. The
response  in  most  years  was  a modest  macro  contraction  together
with relatively  successful  export  promotion  efforts. Shocks
turned  favorable  in  1986  primarily  due to improved  terms-of-trade.
o  India. The  magnitude  of external  shocks  for  India  was relatively
low,  partly  because  India  was  not a  very open  country  and also
trade  accounted  for  only  a small  portion  of GDP.  It  adopted  an
inward-looking  policy  up to recent  times. There  are  some  who
would  argue,  that  this  relative  insulation  from  the  outside  world
served  them  reasonably  well,  during  the  oil  shocks  and the
slowdown  in the  global  economy  in the  early  eighties. However,  in
an import  substitution  economy,  like  India  at that  time,  imports
were already  compressed  so that  policymakers  were severely
constrained  in their  room  to  maneuver. Given  that  further  import
compression  requires  large  reductions  in  domestic  demand  and  an
endemic  anti-export  bias,  it is  perhaps  not  too  surprising  that
increased  foreign  borrowing  resultel. The costs  of this  approach
became  evident  in the  late  eighties  when  a noncompetitive
industrial  sector  was not  well positioned  to take  advantage  of the
surge  in global  demand.- 40 -
o  Kenya. Kenya  reflects  the  problems  of many  African  countries.
Its  exports  have a large  commodity  component  while  its  imports  are
heavily  biased  towards  capital  equipment  and intermediate  goods.
Consequently,  for  much  of the  period  considered  here,  they
experienced  unfavorable  mo.-ements  in terms  of trade  and adverse
global  market  conditions. A notable  exception  was 1977  when
coffee  prices  benefitted  from  a frost  in Brazil. The  policy
response  to these  unfavorable  external  shocks  on the  current
account  was to rely  on external  financing  and  reinforce  further
the traditional  dependence  on import  substitution.  Even  during
the  boom period  (roughly  1977-79)  public  expenditures  increased  as
if the  boom  was  perceived  as permanent.
Generally  export  promotion  efforts  were  weak  with the  exception  of
tourism  and  horticulture. These  two  exports,  aided  by a favorable
exchange  rate,  have expanded  rapidly  since  the  mid-1980s.
O  XMdlawi.  The  pattern  of shocks  here was  similar  to  Kenya.  The
response  indicates  a  stronger  export  promotion  effort,  during  much
of the  period,  than in  Kenya. There  was also  more reliance  in
Malawi  on macro  contraction.
o  Malaysia. Malaysia  has a ruch  more  diverse  export  composition
than  most  developing  countries  and is  also  an oil exporter. Thus
it experienced  favorable  slocks  in  most of the  decade  prior  to
1981.  However,  when oil  prices  softened  and  global  demand- 41 -
weakened  in the  early  eighties,  Malaysia  initially  responded  by an
expansionary  macro  policy  and  continued  to stress  export
promotion. As conditions  failed  to  respond  promptly,  the
authorities  adopted  a number  of policy  measures. The  content  of
these  policy  measures  included  trade  liberalization,  relaxation  of
NEP  related  rules  on euployment  and  more favorable  treatment  of
foreign  investment.  These  measures,  along  with  deep cutbacks  in
the  fiscal  deficit  provided  a strong  indicator  of the  government's
commitment  to  macroeconomic  stability  and  promotion  of a  healthy
private  sector. This  policy  combination  set  the  stage  for  a
strong  recovery  in the  late  eighties.
_  !nted  State.  The  Unites  States  experienced  unfavorable  but
modest  external  shocks  throughout  virtually  the  whole  of this
period. The  policy  response  involved  some  export  promotion  and
import  substitution  together  with  macroeconomic  expansion  up to
the  early  eighties. This  was supported  by additional  external
borrowing. Around  1983/84  there  was some  reversal  of  policies  to
a  more expansionary  macro  mode.  However a rather  indifferent
export  promotion  effort  ensued. Again,  this  was supported  by
further  external  financing.
VII.  CONCLUSION
38.  The  first  conclusion  is rather  pedantic  but important. External
shocks  can  have a  major  impact  and so  need  to be given  adequate  consideration
in formulating  country  economic  policy. However,  there  is a great  deal  of- 42 -
variation  between  countries  so that  any  analysis  needs  to  have  a country
focus. In some  instances  shocks  can  be as high  as 10 percent  of GDP in any
one  year.  The size  and  various  components  of the  shock  depends  on such
factors  as degree  of openness,  export/import  composition,  external  debt.  The
adjustment  to shocks  also  varies  a great  deal  between  countries,  with some  of
them  relying  on additional  external  financing  while  others  place  more emphasis
on export  promotion  and  yet others  on import  substitution.  An interesting
question  is  which  policy  instruments  led  to the  various  performance
indicators,  and is there  a "correct"  response  to shocks. The  present  work
does  not provide  a definitive  answer  to either  of these  at this  stage,  but
does offer  some insights  that  may  eventually  be of use to  policymakers  facing
these  issues.- 43 -
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RESULTS  OF SHOCKS  IN SELECTED  COUNTRIES:
COUNTRY  DATA SHEETS
o  BRAZIL








o  UNITED  STATESI.  Shocks  ds  perLenlt  ot  ,DP
- Couitry=Brazil  - -----  --  ------------------  ---  -
lerms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total
and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1913  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.0  -0.3
1974  1.2  0.3  0.2  0.0  1.7
1975  2.3  0.9  -0.1  0.0  3.1
1976  0.5  0.5  -0.5  0.0  0.5 1977  -1.1  0.2  -0.3  0.0  -1.2
1918  0.2  0.1  0.3  -0.0  0.6 1979  1.2  O.1  0.5  0.0  1.8 1980  2.9  0.4  0.5  -0.1  3.7
1981  3.1  0.6  0.6  -0.0  4.2 1982  1.7  0.b  -0.1  0.0  2.1
1983  0.6  1.6  -1.3  0.0  0.9 1984  -0.6  0.5  -0.5  -0.0  -0.6 1985  -0.2  0.3  0.9  -0.0  -0.8 1986  -1.3  -0.2  -0.9  0.0  -2.4
1987  0.0  0.0  -0.4  0.0  -0.3
11.  Adjustments  as  percent  of  6OP  19:17  Monday.  October  21.  1991  8
-------------------  Country=Brazil  ----  ---  --  --  ---------------------  ---
Total  Adj. Export  Output  Import  Addlitional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Add).  Fin
1913  0.1  -0.6  -0.6  0.1  -0.3
1974  0.5  -0.4  -2.8  4.4  1.7 1975  1.0  0.2  0.4  1.5  3.1 1976  0.1  0.2  1.2  -1.0  0.5 1977  -0.6  0.5  1.8  -3.0  -1.2 1978  0.0  0.7  0.6  -0.8  0.6
1979  0.5  0.7  -0.1  0.7  1.8
1980  2.1  0.3  0.6  0.7  3.7
1981  2.7  1.4  1.3  1.2  4.2 1982  0.5  1.4  1.5  -1.4  2.1 1983  2.0  2.1  2.1  -5.2  0.9 1984  2.2  1.1  1.7  -5.6  -0.6 1985  1.1  0.3  1.2  3.4  -0.8
1986  -1.7  0.0  -0.8  0.0  -2.4 1987  -0.2  0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3
0'-a
It 1---  --  -------------------  Country=Cote  dIvoire  ----- ~-~-~-----------------------------------  ---------
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
19/4  -2.9  1.6  0.5  1.7  0.9 1975  4.3  3.7  -0.2  2.0  9.8 1976  -0.9  2.0  -0.9  3.4  3.7 1977  -15.6  0.9  -0.4  2.2  -13.0  - 1978  -4.9  0.4  0.5  2.3  -1.6 1979  -0.5  0.5  1.0  2.7  3.7 1980  2.6  ,  1.5  0.9  2.6  7.5 1981  11.1  3.1  0.9  1.0  14.1 1982  11.0  2.4  -0.2  -2.9  10.3 1983  4.6  5.5  -1.8  -3.3  5.0 1984  -5.9  1.5  -0.7  -1.7  -6.7 1985  -9.5  0.9  -1.7  -0.7  -11.0 1986  -4.9  -0.5  -1.6  0.9  -6.1 1987  2.6  0.1  -0.9  0.6  2.4
11.  Adjustments  as  percent  of  GDP  19:17  Monday.  October  21.  1991  12
--  -.  - - --  - ------  Country=Cote  dlvoire  - ---  ----  - ---------  -------  ----  -
ITtal  Adj.
Export  Output  Import  AdUiltiuridi  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addi.  Fin
1914  6.0  2.1  -2.4  -4.8  0.9 1975  3.8  0.4  3.7  2.0  9.8 1976  4.8  -0.9  3.5  -3.7  3.7 1977  -4.3  0.2  -4.2  -4.6  -13.0 1978  0.3  -0.1  -4.2  2.4  -1.6 1979  -4.4  1.3  0.7  6.1  3.7 1980  -2.4  2.3  1.5  6.1  7.5 1981  2.4  2.7  7.6  1.4  14.1 1982  4.2  3.3  8.0  -5.3  10.3 1983  1.7  3.6  4.9  -5.2  5.0 1984  0.3  4.1  1.7  -12.9  -6.7 1985  -2.6  1.9  0.9  -11.3  -11.0 1986  -1.3  1.0  0.6  -6.4  -6.1 1987  -2.5  1.6  0.3  3.0  2.4
0
I-3
o  oXI  . >WiukS  as  pe,  cent  of 4jp 
.
---  -----------------------  Cou-  try=Germany  ------------------------------------------------  ---------
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  lrnstrs  Total and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1973  -1.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  -0.7 1974  0.4  1.0  0.0  0.5  1.9 1975  -0.6  2.7  -0.0  0.5  2.6 1916  0.3  1.6  -0.0  0.3  2.1 1977  -0.1  0.8  -0.0  0.2  0.7 1978  -1.1  0.3  -0.0  0.3  ,-0.6 1979  -0.5  0.3  0.0  0.4  0.2 1980  1.0  1.0  0.0  O.S  2.5 1981  3.0  2.2  0.0  -0.0  5.2 1982  0.9  1.7  -0.0  -0.2  2.5 1983  -0.4  3.7  0.0  -0.3  3.1 1994  0.4  1.2  0.0  -0.0  1.6 1965  0.2  0.7  0.1  -0.1  0.8 1986  -4.0  -0.4  0.1  0.3  -4.0 1987  -4.1  0.1  0.0  0.5  -3.6
II. Adjustments  dS  percent  of UUP  19:17  Monidy.  ULtuber-  21.  1991  18
.__  - ----------------------  Country=Germany  ----  ----  ---  --  -
Totdl  Adj. taport  Output  Import  Adtdit  ioldi  I  ncludrirg Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addl.  Fin
1913  0.4  0.0  -0.4  -0.7  -0.7 1974  3.0  0.4  -0.2  -1.2  1.9 1975  0.4  0.9  -0.3  1.6  2.6 1976  1.1  0.4  -2.0  2.6  2.1 .1977  0.0  0.2  -1.0  1.6  0.7 1978  -0.2  0.0  -0.9  0.5  -0.6 1979  -0.7  -0.1  -1.0  2.0  0.2 1980  -0.2  0.1  -0.5  3.1  2.5 1981  1.6  0.5  1.2  1.8  5.2 1982  0.7  1.2  0.8  -0.2  2.5 1983  2.2  0.4  -0.1  0.6  3.1 1984  0.9  0.3  -1.0  1.3  1.6 1985  1.4  0.2  -1.3  0.5  0.8 1986  -0.7  0.3  -1.2  -2.3  -4.0 1987  -0.8  0.2  -1.1  -1.9  -3.6
0  t  0
O  g--  ....-. - .--------------------  Cauntry=lndia  ------------------  -----------------------------------
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Totil and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1913  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.1 1974  1.4  0.2  0.0  -2.2  -0.6 1975  1.9  0.6.  -0.0  0.4  2.9 1976  0.2  0.4  -0.0  0.0  1.2 1977  -1.0  0.2  -0.0  0.0  -0.8 1978  -0.7  0.G  0.0  -0.5  -1.1 1979  0.6  0.1  -0.0  -0.5  0.1 1980  0.4  0.3  . -0.1  -1.0  -0.4 1981  -0.7  0.4  -0.0  -0.4  -0.6 1982  -1.4  0.3  -0.0  -0.1  -1.1 1983  -1.1  0.7  -0.1  0.0  -0.5 1904  -1.8  0.2  -0.0  0.1  -1.5 1985  -0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1 1986  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  -0.1 1987  -0.9  0.0  -0.1  -O.t  -1.0
11.  Adjustments  as  percent  of  GDP  19:17  Monday.  OLtuber  21.  1991  3b
--  -.  ----------------------  Countfy=lndia  -----  - ----  - --
Total  Adj. Export  Output  Import  Adlit,ondl  Including Promotion  . Compression  Substitution  financing  Addi.  Fin
1914  -0.3  0.2  -0.2  0.3  0.1 1974  0.0  0.3  0.6  -1.5  -0.6 1975  1.1  -0.2  1.3  0.7  2.9 1976  1.1  -0.1  1.0  -0.9  1.2 1971  0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.6  -0.8 1978  -0.5  -0.2  -1.3  0.9  -1.1 1979  -0.3  0.4  -1.4  1.5  0.1 1980  -0.5  0.1  -2.2  2.1  -0.4 1981  0.5  -0.1  -2.4  1.4  -0.6 1982  0.4  -0.2  -1.4  0.1  -1.1 1983  0.9  -0.4  -0.2  -0.7  -0.5 1984  0.1  -0.2  -1.1  -0.4  -1.5 1985  -0.7  -0.3  0.5  0.6  0.1 1986  -0.4  -0.2  0.2  0.3  -0.1 1987  0.3  -0.0  -1.3  0.0  -1.0
-1.  Shocks  as  perceit  oft  GOP
---  Counstry=lreland  - ---------------  ----
ferms-of-Trade  Net  lIntrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  lrnsfrs  lotal and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Sho^X
1Mt3  -4.5  0.1  -0.0  -1.5  -5.9 u1Y4  7.7  1.6  0.0  -2.2  7.1 1975  8.9  3.5  -0.0  -2.1  10.3 1976  3.5  2.3  -0.4  -0.2  5.2 1977  1.2  1.1  -0.4  -2.5  -0.7 1978  0.2  0.4  0.6  -3.5  -2.3 1979  3.3  0.4  0.9  -3.4  1.3 1980  6.9  1.4  0.8  -1.7  7.3 1981  5.5  2.7  0.8  1.3  10.3 set'  0.3  2.1  -0.2  1.2  3.3 1983  -3.6  4.8  -2.1  0.7  -0.2 1984  -1.7  1.6  -1.0  0.2  -0.9 1985  -1.0  0.9  2.0  1.2  -3.4 1986  -2.5  -0.6  -2.5  -'.6  -7.2 1987  -2.1  0.1  -1.1  -0.9  -4.0 1988  -2.4  -1.1  0.4  -1.0  -4.1
Ii.  Adjustments  as percent  ot GOP  19:17  Monday.  Oototber 21.  1991  38
- - ------  ---------  Country=lreland  --  - - -----  -
Total  Adj.
Export  Output  Import  Additional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addl.  Fin
19/3  -1.7  -0.3  -5.0  1.0  -5.9 1914  1.2  -0.7  -1.2  7.8  7.1 1975  5.6  -0.3  7.8  -2.8  10.3
1976  3.7  1.7  0.4  -0.6  5.2
1977  4.5  -0.5  -3.4  -1.4  -0.7 1978  5.6  -1.6  -7.4  1.0  -2.3 1979  3.6  -0.6  -9.0  7.4  1.3 1980  3.5  0.4  -0.6  4.0  7.3 1981  3.4  0.4  1.9  4.6  10.3 1982  2.2  1.2  5.1  -5.1  3.3 1983  8.9  1.2  0.0  -10.3  -0.2 1984  9.3  1.2  -2.7  -8.6  -0.9 1985  6.3  1.4  -2.9  -8.2  -3.4 1986  0.5  3.4  -3.6  -7.5  -7.2 ;S87  4.4  1.8  -1.9  -8.2
1988  2.3  1.7  -0.6  -7.S  -4.1
I-i
lb
H  01.  Shocks  as  percenit  ot  bUP
------------  Cotorktry=Kei,ya 
--  -----  --
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fue1  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1973  4.2  0.0  0.4  0.4  5.1 1974  8.0  0.9  0.5  0.4  9.8 1975  9.2  2.2  -0.2  -0.4  10.9 1976  1.5  1.3  -1.1  0.6  2.4 1977  -6.6  0.6  -0.5  -0.8  -7.3 1978  0.4  0.3  0.5  -0.9  0.2 1979  4.4  0.3  0.6  -:  .5  4.8 1980  8.6  0.8  0.5  -0.9  9.0 1981  9.5  1.4  0.4  -1.6  9.8 1982  4.4  1.1  -0.1  0.3  5.7 1983  3.0  2.5  -0.8  -0.2  4.6 1984  -2.1  0.7  -0.3  -0.0  -1.7 1985  1.7  0.4  0 7  -0.5  e  1.0 1986  -1.0  -0.3  -0.8  -0.3  -2.3 1987  2.3  0.1  -0.4  -0.3  1.7
11.  Adjustments  as  pereent  of  (GDP  19:17  Monddy.  Ootober  21.  19111  bo
---  ------------------------  Count,y=Kenya  ---------------------  --------------------  ------  --------
Total  Adj.
Export  Output  Import  Additional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addl.  Fin
1)1:3  1.6  -2.9  7.9  -1.5  5.1 1974  0.3  0.1  3.0  6.5  9.8 1975  0.5  2.7  7.3  0.5  10.9 1976  -2.4  3.4  6.6  -5.2  2.4 1977  -1.6  *  1.1  0.5  -7.4  -7.3 1978  -2.9  0.3  -7.0  9.7  0.2 1979  -2.8  -0.2  3.0  4.8  4.8 1980  1.6  0.3  2.5  7.9  9.0 1981  -1.1  1.2  13,0  -3.4  9.8 1982  -1.9  2.5  II.:  -6.2  5.7 1983  0.2  3.0  13.8  .12.4  4.6 1984  -1.1  2.4  2.3  -5.4  -1.7 1985  -0.2  1.6  2.8  -3.3  1.0 1986  0.9  0.4  -1.2  -2.4  -2.3 1987  -0.4  0.0  -1.5  3.5  1'.71.  5hoCkb'85  percent  ut  LaUP
- --  -------- ----------  ------ ----------------------  Country=Korea  -----------------------------------------------------------
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1973  3.5  0.0  0.1  -0.1  3.5 1974  9.7  0.8  0.2  -0.2  10.4 1975  8.7  2.5  -0.1  -0.1  10.9 1976  1.2  1.3  -0.4  -0.5  1.7 1917  -2.t  0.7  -0.2  0.1  -1.6 197B  -2.3  0.3  0.2  -0.4  -2.3 1919  0.1  0.3  0.3  -0.1  0.6 1980  6.4  1.1  0.6  -0.1  8.0 1981  5.H  1.9  0.6  -0.1  8.2 1982  0.7  1.5  -0.1  -0.0  2.0 1983  -1.5  3.3  -0.8  -0.1  0.9 1984  -1.3  1.1  -0.3  -0.0  -0.6 1985  -0.8  0.6  -0.6i  -0.0  -0.8 1986  -2.7  -0.5  -0.6  -0.4  -4.2 1987  -2.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -2.5 1988  -2.2  -0.8  0.0  -0.3  -3.2
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----  - ----  ----------  ----------------------------  Country=Korea  ------------------------------------------------ 
--------
lotal Adj. Export  Output  Import  Additionral  Includting Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addi.  Fin
1973  10.7  -0.4  -3.3  -3.6  3.5 1974  7.6  -0.4  -1.9  5.1  10.4 1975  7.6  -0.2  1.1  2.4  10.9 1976  9.0  -0.7  -2.2  -4.5  1.7 1977  7.5  -0.8  -4.2  -4.1  -1.6 1978  5.2  -0.7  -6.8  -0.0  -2.3 1979  0.0  0.2  -3.9  4.3  0.6 1980  2.0  4.6  -0.8  2.2  8.0 1981  5.4  3.9  0.7  -1.8  8.2 1982  3.6  2.4  1.2  -5.2  2.0 1983  6.9  -0.8  0.6  -5.8  0.9 1984  3.9  -0.6  0.6  -4.5  -0.6 1985  2.1  0.1  1.9  -4.9  -0.8 1986  5.1  -0.5  -0.6  -8.2  -4.2 1987  8.9  -1.1  . -2.8  -7.5  -2.5 1988  6.5  -1.1  -2.3  -6.2  -3.2
'-I1. Shocks  "a percent  ot  GOP
----  ------------------------  Couptry=Malawi  ----------------------------------  --------
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intist
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total
and other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1973  3.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.6  2.3 1974  5.3  1.1  -0.6  0.2  6.1 1975  5.8  2.5  0.2  0.0  8.6 1976  4.5  . 1.4  -0.4  -2.6  2.9 1977  -1.9  0.7  0.0  -1.3  -2.5 1978  0.9  0.3  0.7  -2.7  -0.9 1979  6.5  0.4  2.5  -2.0  7.3 1980  9.2  0.9  2.0  -1.7  10.4 1981  1.7  1.6  1.6  -0.3  4.5 1982  -2.1  1.4  -0.2  0.9  -0.1 1983  0.2  3.1  -2.0  1.5  2.8 1984  0.3  1.0  -0.9  1.0  1.4 1985  4.0  0.6  -1.8  0.4  3.4 1986  4.9  -0.4  -2.1  -0.5  1.8 1987  2.8  0.1  -0.8  -0.5  1.6 1988  0.9  -0.8  0.1  -4.6  -4.4
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--------------------------------------------------  Country=Malawi  --------------------------------------------------
Total Adj.
Export  Output  Import  Additional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addi.  Fin
1913  1.4  -0.'.  1.6  -0.1  2.3 1914  0.5  -0.4  2.1  3.8  6.1 1915  1.7  -1.1  -1.0  9.0  8.6 1976  1.5  -0.5  9.6  -7.7  2.9 '1977  -3.0  0.1  10.3  -9.9  -2.5 1978  -3.9  -0.9  1.2  2.8  -0.9 1979  1.8  -0.6  -1.4  7.5  7.3 1990  5.6  1.3  5.0  -1.5  10.4 1981  -1.9  4.3  9.3  -7.2  4.5 1982  -4.9  3.0  6.6  -4.7  -0.1 1993  0.6  0.9  3.0  -1.8  2.8 1984  4.8  0.2  6.0  -9.6  1.4 1985  3.1  0.0  0.9  -0.7  3.4 1986  -0.6  0.8  4.8  -3.1  1.8 1987  -1.5  1.2  2.4  -0.5  1.6 1988  -2.6  1.2  -2.7  -0.3  -4.4
1  CD  f
0 
*  X1.  Sthocks  *as percent  of  GDP
-----------------------  Country=ialaysia  ----------------  ------------------  ---------
lerms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  total and  other)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1913  -4.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  -3.5 1974  -11.3  1.0  0.6  -0.1  -9.7 1975  0.5  3.3  -0.2  -0.2  3.3 1976  -2.1  1.9  -1.0  -0.1  -1.1 1977  -4.5  1.0  -0.5  -0.0  -4.1 1978  -3.0  0.4  0.6  0.1  -2.0 1979  -11.1  0.4  0.9  -0.1  -9.9 1980  -8.6  1.4  0.6  -0.0  -6.6 1981  1.8  2.9  0.5  0.0  5.2 1982  6.9  2.3  -0.1  0.0  .9.1 1983  3.6  4.3  -1.5  -0.1  6.4 1984  -2.2  1.2  -0.6  0.0  -1.6 1985  1.8  0.8  -1.2  -0.1  1.4 1986  11.5  -0.7  -1.5  -0.2  9.1 1987  0.5  0.1  -0.7  -0.4  -0.5
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.---  --  --  ----  --- - -----------------------  Country=Malaysia  ----------------------------------------------  --------
lotal  Adj. Export  Output  Import  Additional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Addl.  Fin
1973  -0.8  -2.3  2.6  -3.0  -3.5 1974  -6.4  -3.9  -2.1  2.7  -9.7 1975  -0.9  -2.5  4.7  2.0  3.3 1976  6.2  -1.8  3.1  -8.7  -1.1 1977  2.7  -1.2  0.5  -6.1  -4.1 1978  4.6  -0.7  -3.9  -2.0  -2.0 1979  3.0  -0.9  -5.8  -6.2  -9.9 1980  0.5  -1.6  -4.9  -0.5  -6.6 1981  -2.1  -2.2  -1.2  10.7  5.2 1982  1.4  -0.7  -1.4  9.8  9.1 1983  11.9  -1.7  -1.4  -2.3  6.4 1984  9.9  -0.5  -0.1  -11.0  -1.6 1985  6.9  2.9  3.1  -11.5  1.4 1986  10.2  4.8  0.7  -6.6  9.1 1987  8.6  3.0  -2.2  -9.9  -0.5
OQ-
Y  H----  -------------------  Country=United  Stdtes  ----------------------------------------------  --
Terms-of-Trade  Net  Intrst
Shock  (Fuel  Export  Volume  Rate  Trnsfrs  Total and  othtr)  Shock  Shock  Shock  Shock
1973  0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1 1974  1.1  0.3  -0.2  0.2  1.5 1975  0.8  0.8  0.1  -0.0  1.7 1976  0.2  0.5  0.3  -0.0  1.0
1977  0.2  0.3  0.2  -0.0  0.6
1978  0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.2 1979  0.7  0.1  -0.3  0.0  0.5 1980  1.6  0.4  -0.2  0.1  1.8 1981  0.7  0.6  -0.2  0.0  1.2
1982  -0.0  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.6 1983  -0.6  1.1  0.2  0.0  0.8
1984  -0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2
1985  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 1986  -0.4  -0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.3 1987  0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.3 1988  0.2  -0.2  -0.0  -0.0  0.0
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----------------------------------------------------  Country=United  States  ----------------
Total Adj.
Export  Output  Import  Additional  Including
Promotion  Compression  Substitution  financing  Adol.  Fin
1913  0.6  -0.1  -0.4  0.1  0.1
1974  1.0  0.1  -0.3  0.7  1.5
1975  0.8  0.3  0.8  -0.2  1.7
1976  -0.1  0.1  -0.5  1.5  1.0
1977  -0.4  -0.1  -1.0  2.1  0.6
197-8  0.0  -0.3  -0.9  1.4  0.2
1979  0.7  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  a.5
1980  1.0  0.2  0.6  0.0  1.8
19B1  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.2  1.2
1982  -1.2  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.6
1983  -0.6  0.1.  -0.5  1.8  0.8
1984  -0.4  -0.3  -1.4  2.3  0.2
1985  -0.3  -0.3  -0.9  1.7  0.1
1986  -0.4  -0.2  -1.1  1.4  -0.3
1987  0.1  -0.2  -0.5  0.8  0.3
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